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This article offers some critical realist, strategic-relational comments on Colin Hay’s 
proposal to treat the state as an ‘as-if-real’ concept. The critique first develops an 
alternative account of ontology, which is more suited to analyses of the state and 
state power; it then distinguishes the ‘intransitive’ properties of the real world as an 
object of investigation from the ‘transitive’ features of its scientific investigation and 
thereby provides a clearer understanding of what is at stake in ‘as-if-realism’; and it 
ends with the suggestion that a concern with the modalities of state power rather 
than with the state per se offers a more fruitful approach to the genuine issues raised 
in Hay’s article and in his earlier strategic-relational contributions to political analysis. 
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Colin Hay is correct to note the problematic character of the concept of the state. 
Many are the attempts, especially in political science, to dismiss it on various 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological grounds. Yet, as Jens Bartelson 
(2001) shows, the concept tends to re-enter, in other guises, the writings of those 
who dismiss it. Hay does not belong to the dismissive camp. Instead he seeks to 
explain the problematic character of the state (and its concept) mainly on ontological 
grounds and, thus armed, argues for the heuristic power of the state as an 'as-if-real' 
concept. At the end of a sometimes convoluted argument, however, Hay arrives, 
without fully acknowledging it, at a political ontology of state power as a social 
relation rather than at a political ontology of the state as a structural entity. This 
conclusion is consistent with his earlier work on structure-agency and state theory 
and, I suggest, starting from state power would have provided him with a more direct 




Ontology has two referents, which are both present but not clearly distinguished in 
Hay's argument. It can refer, first, to the nature and properties of being or existence 
and the categorial structure of reality. This involves relatively foundational, 
transhistorical questions. Hay operates in these terms when he introduces three 
accounts of reality: philosophical realism, philosophical constructivism, and 'as-if-
realism'. The general issue of structure-agency dialectics also belongs here. 
However Hay suggests 'the existential status of the state, [....] as an ontological 
matter, is likely to prove insoluble' (2014: xxx). Thus he rejects attempts to 
'ontologize the state' in favour of efforts `to demonstrate and defend the value and 
insight to be gained from the use of the concept of the state as an analytical 
abstraction' (2014: xxx, xxx). Accordingly much of his analysis relates to another 
level of ontological investigation, defined by Jonathan Lowe as 'the set of things 
whose existence is acknowledged by a particular theory or system of thought' (1995: 
634). This involves more specific theoretical issues and is inherently more pluralistic 
(cf. Jessop 1990: 11-13). Hay operates in these terms when he considers different 
approaches to the nature and properties of the state (including the claim that it does 
not exist) and assesses their analytical purchase. 
 
In addressing ontology in the first sense, Hay rejects philosophical realism (also 
known as critical realism) and philosophical constructivism in favour of an 
`ontological as-if-realism'. Critical realism makes two claims that are relevant here. 
First, it posits a stratified world in which real mechanisms generate effects at the 
level of the actual, evidence for which may exist at the level of the empirical. In these 
terms it asks what the world must be like for these effects to occur, positing or 
retroducing real mechanisms on this basis, and evaluating the evidence for the 
existence and operation of these mechanisms. Second, it distinguishes the 
intransitive and transitive moments of scientific inquiry. The intransitive refers to the 
external world as an object of scientific observation and, perhaps, experimental 
intervention; the transitive refers to the tools, techniques and practices of scientific 
communities as they seek to produce scientific knowledge about the external world. 
Both claims matter for political analysis but, in this section, I focus on the implications 
of the stratified nature of the natural and social worlds. 
 
Critical realists too often tend to defend their position in general terms against other 
broad ontological approaches. But one cannot apply 'critical realism in general' in 
scientific work – only particular critical realist positions, which belong to the second 
level of ontology (Jessop 2005). Yet Hay considers only philosophical realism in 
general and claims, wrongly, that it commits its state-theoretical adherents to the 
view that, by analogy with the gravity effects produced by the single underlying 
mechanism of gravity, the state is the single underlying mechanism that generates 
state effects. On this spurious basis he rejects philosophical realism for treating the 
state as 'a structural concept' (or mechanism) and backs this conclusion by criticizing 
the crude (stylized) Marxist view that the improbable persistence of capitalist social 
relations is explained, in part, through coordinated state policies whose coherence is 
guaranteed by the state qua 'ideal collective capitalist' (Hay 2014: xxx-xx; the same 
pseudo-explanation is also critiqued in Jessop 1982: 216-17 and passim). However, 
for critical realists, the 'real' need not comprise a single, gravity-like mechanism with 
causal powers that generates a corresponding set of 'actual' effects. Hay seems to 
concede this when he refers to the philosophical realist interest in the 'underlying 
structural level of reality (comprised of a series of structural entities like the state) 
which underpins the surface level of appearance (comprised of things that are 
"actual")' (Hay 2014: xxx, my italics). This begs the question whether the state is a 
just one 'structural entity' among others (outside the state) or could itself comprise a 
series of such entities and their interrelations. 
 
In this sense, the analogy with gravity is misleading. The real can comprise diverse 
mechanisms that, through interacting tendencies and counter-tendencies in specific 
conjunctures produce actual effects that are the overdetermined (or contingently 
necessary) result of these particular interactions (Jessop 1982: 211-20; 1990: 11-13, 
204-5). So it would be a courageous critical realist indeed who argued that the set of 
mechanisms that generated a heterogeneous set of 'state effects' could be 
categorized without further ado as 'the state', even if this were analysed as an 
'assemblage' rather than a single structural entity. This would entail a fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness, that is, treatment of a complex set of social relations as if it 
were a physical entity endowed with powers (a 'thing') or a calculating agent with 
free will (a rational 'subject). Ordinary language may sometimes suggest these 
possibilities but it is a rare state theorist who would endorse them. 
 
The as if 'as if' real 
 
In addition to his rejection of philosophical realism for positing the state as a 
structural entity, Hay rejects the constructivist position that the state is a fictional 
'non-entity' that may none the less have actual effects if agents orient their actions in 
light of this fiction. This critique is misleading. It is not the 'non-entity' that produces 
these effects but the actually existing fiction as an element of situated action. He 
then introduces his alternative. The state is neither really real nor purely imaginary: it 
is 'as-if-real'. This term has three possible meanings and Hay opts for the third. 
 
First, agnostic realism infers (retroduces) the real from its effects but, without hard 
evidence for its existence, it must conclude that it is only possibly real. This would 
seem to make the 'ideal collective capitalist', previously rejected, possibly real. 
Second, sceptical as-if-realism accepts that the state is not real but emphasizes that 
to assume that it exists provides a useful synthetic or synoptic reference point for 
political analysis. This position would probably be better described as pragmatic 
rather than sceptical (which, at least in philosophical terms, connotes the claim that 
certain kinds of knowledge are impossible) and is similar to mainstream economists' 
use of models as necessary simplifications. 
 
Third, ontological as-if-realism, Hay's position, argues that the 'as-if-real' is rendered 
real to analysts by its effects. More clearly than in the other two cases, this position 
privileges what critical realists term the transitive moment of social science. Whereas 
'agnostic as-if realists' are not certain that the real exists in the intransitive world but 
are inclined to assume that it does by virtue of its alleged effects, 'sceptical as-if 
realists' are certain that it does not exist (or, perhaps, are convinced that one cannot 
know whether or not it exists) but pretend that it does on pragmatic grounds, at least 
for some theoretical and/or practical purposes. In contrast, Hay argues that, in so far 
as positing the existence of the state in full knowledge that it is a simplifying 
abstraction is scientifically productive, this would justify treating it as an 'as-if-real' 
phenomenon. He argues that this position should not be interpreted from the 
viewpoint of lay actors and/or authorized political subjects who may orient their 
political actions in the light of ideas about the state, with practical effects that appear 
to them to confirm the reality of the state (Hay 2014: xxx-xx). Rather, central to Hay's 
argument is the open question about how useful social scientists find it to interpret 
and explain practices, processes, and effects in terms of the 'state' as an analytical 
or conceptual abstraction (Hay 2014: xxx). This open ontological question avoids the 
charge of misplaced concreteness because it refuses to treat the 'as-if-real as if it 
were really real (Hay 2014: xxx-xx). Word play apart, it is clear that this approach 
does not commit the ontological 'as-if-realist' to agnostic possibilism or pragmatic 
pretence. This is because it concerns the transitive features of scientific 
investigation, not the intransitive features of the world studied by scientists. For the 
same reason, this approach does not commit her/him to a claim to have grasped the 
full complexity of the real. On the contrary, to posit more or less useful as-if-real 
entities enables her/him to cope with the very real impossibility of such omniscience 
and to reflect on the theoretical and practical limits as well as heuristic utility of 
her/his abstractions. Here, in other words, and paradoxically, Hay unwittingly deploys 
the critical realist distinction between the intransitive and transitive, which highlights 
the fallibility and incompleteness of knowledge about the real world and has served 
to critique the 'ontic fallacy' that knowledge is a direct, unmediated relation between 
a knowing subject and the external world. But he cannot build on it because he has 
already dismissed philosophical realism and does not engage (here at least) with 
how different scientific paradigms and/or communities develop knowledge and, in 
particular, evaluate their assumptions and hypotheses. 
 
Conclusion: towards a political ontology of state power 
 
In addressing the nature of the state, Nicos Poulantzas, building on Karl Marx and 
Antonio Gramsci, posited that 'the state is a social relation'. Less elliptically, this 
implies that state power is the form-determined (institutionally-mediated) 
condensation of a shifting balance of forces oriented to the exercise of capacities 
and powers associated with particular political forms and institutions as these are 
embedded in the wider social formation (Poulantzas 1978). Philip Abrams (1988) 
adumbrated this position when he rejected the mystifying notion of the state as a 
unified structuring mechanism that actualizes the general will and argued that 
scholars should study how ideas about the nature and purposes of the state shape 
the exercise of state power in the context of the state system qua institutional 
ensemble. Pierre Bourdieu (2014) likewise analysed the 'collective fiction' of the 
state – a fiction with very real effects – as the path-dependent product of all struggles 
among different interests, the stakes in these struggles, and their very foundation in 
the state apparatus as the site of symbolic and coercive power. 
 
All three positions (and similar ones also exist) suggest that starting from state power 
rather than the state provides a better entry-point to questions of political ontology. It 
invites immediate attention to: (1) the nature of the state as a heterogeneous 
institutional ensemble (comprising, minimally, a territory, apparatus, and population) 
that has no agency per se but does have various capacities and action-relevant 
biases inscribed in itself when considered as a strategic terrain; (2) the role of ideas 
about the nature and purposes of state power, or state projects, in creating the 
appearance that the state acts as if it were a unitary subject by orienting political 
subjects as they seek to coordinate heterogeneous powers and resources to enact 
and reproduce the state itself and to generate 'state effects' beyond it; and (3) the 
shifting balance of forces that are mobilized, organized and disorganized through 
competing political imaginaries and state projects and how the uneven strategic 
terrain of the state outlining these ideas at the end of his article, Hay arrives at a 
critical realist as well as a strategic-relational position on the ontological specificities 
of state power rather than the state per se. And this is the context in which we can 
make sense of the political effectiveness of ideas about the state and the heuristic 
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